Unification of a divided Korean peninsula has remained the mantra of political elites and the expectation of citizenries on both sides of the demilitarized zone since Korea’s physical division into two occupation zones in the immediate aftermath of World War II, and the more permanent political division that followed in 1948.  This set of circumstances has led to much speculation over the decades as to when the peninsula might again be politically unified and under what scenario this might occur.  Couching the discussion in these terms, however, has contributed to the emergence of falsely antiseptic discussions, which in turn has led to an oversimplification of issues associated with the unification process.

Unification is often regarded as an exercise in reintegrating the political and economic systems of the two Koreas, which themselves represent monumental tasks.  One needs only to recall the experience of German reunification to be reminded of the enormity of the work confronting the two Koreas in creating a unified political and economic infrastructure.  Yet this is only half of the equation.  The other often overlooked half requires due consideration of the human factor, including the reintegration of two very different peoples with differing cultures, value sets, political ideologies, recent histories and growing discrepancies in language, all of which lead to strongly differing expectations.  All of these factors are potentially further exacerbated by another often overlooked historical fact, mainly that northern Koreans have historically been shunned, discriminated against and segregated by their southern brethren since the Choson period (1392-1910), which was the result of deliberate government policies instituted by Yi Dynasty government officials.  At best, the aggregate of such human factors present enormous challenges for unifying the peninsula; at worst they could potentially derail such efforts.  Consequently, unification should be seen as comprising dual components: reintegration of political and economic systems and repatriation of both South and North Korean citizens under a unified Korea—one cannot succeed without the other.  This article focuses on a few of the challenges repatriation presents.  

Given the huge disparities in wealth, technologies and the human factors that exist between the two Koreas, the implicit question with regard to unification is this:  Is it possible to unify Korea while also avoiding the creation of a permanent underclass of former North Koreans who will constitute 48.5 percent of the total population?  (The population of South Korea is estimated at 48,379,392, while the estimate for North Korea is 23,479,088: CIA World Factbook July 2008)  Fortunately, the growing number of North Korean refugees fleeing into South Korea provides valuable insights that can be applied to a broader unification scenario, offering clues to potential problem areas.  (A word about nomenclature: This article will not use the word “defector” to refer to North Korean citizens fleeing North Korea, which carries with it certain biased and negative connotations.  A more neutral term is saeteomin, or “new settler”, coined by the South Korean Ministry of Unification in January 2005.  To facilitate readability by an English-speaking readership, however, the term “refugee” will be used.) 

Despite characterizations perpetuated in the mass media of a North Korea in total lockdown controlled by an omnipotent regime, the facts suggest something different.  The number of North Koreans successfully fleeing North Korea has increased exponentially since the end of the Cold War.  For example, through 1991, 625 North Koreans escaped to South Korea; there are presently just over 10,200 North Korean refugees in South Korea.  (Ministry of Unification 2006)  More importantly, however, is the changing composition of North Korean refugees, which in turn impacts how they are perceived.  During the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath the number of North Koreans escaping to South Korea were far fewer and were regarded as being of much greater value for purposes of political propaganda and the intelligence they provided on the opaque North Korean society.  Thus, North Korean air force pilots who flew their Soviet-made aircraft into South Korea in 1996, or high value political refugees such as Hwang Jang-yop, former Korean Workers’ Party secretary, who successfully entered South Korea in 1997, comparatively speaking, were handsomely rewarded.  In the case of the former, the equivalent of $600,000 USD was paid; in the latter the reward was nearly $314,000 USD.
The current composition and numbers of refugees, on the other hand, differ markedly from those of a decade earlier.  In addition to the greater influx of refugees referenced previously, those currently entering South Korea are comprised overwhelmingly of the poorly educated and destitute and thus deemed of little political value.  For example, in 2004, 93.1 percent of all refugees were reported to have been low-level workers (not management or professionals), farmers, students, unemployed housewives, and ex-soldiers.  And this trend continues.  South Korea’s Ministry of Unification reported that in May 2006, of the 8403 refugees in the country at the time, 44 percent had been unemployed in North Korea, while 77 percent of those who had jobs had been manual laborers.   This is more than a mere academic distinction as it adversely impacts South Koreans’ perception of their northern brethren, and those perceptions potentially affect how refugees are treated, and ultimately, the success or failure of their assimilation into South Korean society. 

According to 2006 figures released by the Ministry of Unification, refugees in South Korea have a 51.2 percent unemployment rate compared to an overall South Korean unemployment rate of 3.5 percent during the same period.  Exacerbating this point is that refugees are primarily hired for low-wage, low-skill jobs.  According to a 2005 survey conducted by the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU), 68.8 percent of refugees were either daily or temporary workers.  Finally, even those refugees who are college graduates and held professional positions in North Korea face dim employment prospects in South Korea.  In a March 2005 survey conducted by the Korea Research Institute for Vocational Training and Education, they found that only 2 of 128 professionals were employed in the fields in which they had been trained. 

Refugee perceptions of their lives in South Korea generally comport with these findings and point to potential difficulties in assimilating North Koreans into South Korean society.  Kim and Jang report that in a 2005 KINU study, 56.5 percent of respondents attributed their difficulty in finding jobs to the fact that they are North Korean.  Another 2005 study conducted by the National Committee for Human Rights of South Korea found that 50.5 percent of respondents felt some level of pay discrimination because they are North Korean, and 38.6 percent felt they were purposely isolated by their South Korean co-workers.  While it might be tempting to conclude, based on such statistics, that these findings point to some purposeful behavior on the part of some South Koreans, this must be filtered through a South Korean cultural prism.  Much like other East Asian nations, the importance placed on a tradition of informal connections (hakyeon) developed while studying at universities or regional connections (jiyeon) promote a socially insular network that outsiders find very problematic to overcome, as such culturally ingrained practices are quite difficult to “undo.”  While this may put previously cited statistics in the proper context, it again underscores the magnitude of the problem of addressing human factors associated with unification.

The South Korean government has made some efforts to facilitate assimilation of those refugees already in South Korea, most notably through the creation of a training center that assists refugees in their assimilation process.  Formally known as the Center for Supporting the Adaptation of North Korean Defectors and more commonly referred to as Hanawon, it is located about 46 miles from Seoul.  Hanawon staff train refugees in the basic skills they will need to survive in their environment—how to use banks, computers, subways, and cell phones; how to drive; food shopping and cooking; how to use make-up; and a host of other things.  The program lasts about two and a half months, at the conclusion of which they are given a lump sum payment, equivalent to US$9,000; an additional US$9,000 is provided for down payment on a residence, and they are basically left to fend for themselves.  This program, while well-intentioned, hardly prepares refugees for the rigors of a capitalist society.

Ironically, the increasing numbers of refugees, and the associated cost of assimilating them, have come to be seen by the South Korean government against the backdrop of German reunification, and may well be cooling the commitment to formal unification.  The government generally regards German unification as a negative example to be avoided primarily due to its cost.  Projected costs for unifying the peninsula range widely: US$50 billion-US$670 billion; some estimates project a cost in excess of US$1 trillion.  This “cooling” is most evident when reviewing the history of subsidies offered to North Korean refugees. 

During the Cold War, the subsidies were substantial: free housing and lifetime payments in addition to large lump sum payments.  In 1993 and 1997, however, new laws were enacted that offered decreased benefits to refugees: the settlement payment was set at US$32,000.  Another reduction took place in 2005, reducing the settlement amount to US$9,000 for an individual refugee; families receive more based on its size.  Thus, far from encouraging an exodus of North Korean refugees that would promote the disintegration of the North Korean regime (the South Korean government has always claimed sovereignty over all Koreans according to its constitution, as does North Korea in its constitution), it appears South Korean officials may actually be trying to stem the tide of the recent refugee influx.  Concern over the cost of unification and absorption of North Korea fuels such measures, but the underlying point is this: that South Korea is assisting the regime in avoiding its own implosion.  South Korean officials may be realizing that “having” is not always as pleasing as “wanting.”  Thus, a stabilized North Korea, devoid of a nuclear threat, that is economically cooperative with South Korea as they are in the jointly run industrial project at Kaesong, may be the best of all worlds.