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Democratic Transition in Pakistan

Asma Faiz, doctoral candidate, Department of Political Science


On August 18, 2008, General Pervaiz Musharraf resigned as the President of Pakistan, facing a threat of impeachment from the parliament dominated by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Group (PML-N). This was a landmark event in the political history of Pakistan, as General Musharraf was the first General-President to have been ousted from office by the aforementioned political parties. Previously, this fate had generally been reserved for civilian governments. The departure of General Musharraf was overwhelmingly welcomed by different sections of society who had vehemently rejected his policies during the February 18 elections in 2008. Why did General Musharraf become so discredited in the eyes of the Pakistani populace, while enjoying the support of the international community for being an ally in the ‘war on terrorism’? How did the political parties and civil society succeed in dislodging the all-powerful military dictator from power? The subsequent discussion attempts to answer these questions.     

General Musharraf has the unique distinction of abrogating the constitution and declaring martial laws on two occasions. On October 12, 1999, General Musharraf toppled the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif and suspended the 1973 constitution. Then on November 3, 2007 he once again took all the power in his hands by declaring a state of emergency in the country. Interestingly, General Musharraf’s actions on November 3rd led to the dismantling  of the power structures which he himself had carefully created, providing proof of his failure to deliver the promised ‘good governance’ to the masses. At the popular level, the first military coup was generally greeted with a sigh of relief by the people who had been disillusioned by the corruption and rife incompetence in the Sharif government. However, with the passage of time General Musharraf proved to be another military dictator with a ‘messiah complex’ who ended up doing great damage to the democratic roots of the polity. During his nine years in power, the general attempted to create a centralized and authoritarian political order, following the military doctrine of unity of command and authority. Using a combination of patronage and coercion, he created a group of his loyalist elites in order to civilianize his regime. Through an extremely fraudulent process, he got himself elected as President for five years in 2002. The same year, parliamentary elections were held which installed Musharraf’s loyalists in the upper echelons of power. His original claim to provide ‘good governance’ marked by transparency and accountability soon vanished in the air as large number of politicians with tainted records were let off the hook if they chose to play by the general’s rules. General Musharraf especially targeted the two leading political leaders of the country, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, who were only allowed to come back from exile in late 2007 under extreme domestic and international pressure.

During General Musharrf’s tenure, the military flourished as it was allowed to penetrate almost all sectors of the country’s economy. Beyond this, large numbers of ex-army officers were appointed to high posts in various civilian departments. General Musharraf’s tenure is especially marked by an aura of duality. In various spheres of national life, official policy stances were declared by the government while simultaneously allowing the privileged civilian-military elites to diverge from this path. This duality was reflected in all spheres of policy such as counter-terrorism, economic development and management of center-province relations. Examples of this are found in the form of selective application of accountability laws, financial irregularities evident in the sugar and wheat crises, and the government’s failure to acknowledge gross human rights’ violations by intelligence and security agencies in the name of fighting against extremism and terrorism. In October 2007, General Musharraf got himself elected for a second term as President through a parliament which had completed its tenure and was up for re-election. Moreover, this meant that he was once again occupying two offices at the same time, i.e. President and Chief of Army Staff (COAS), a situation which is clearly forbidden by the constitution of Pakistan. Many believe that it was his fear of being rightfully declared ineligible to hold the office of President by the Supreme Court which led him to his emergency declaration on November 3, 2007. The departure of General Musharraf seems all the more remarkable in the face of his tremendous personalization of power through constitutional engineering. Like his predecessors, General Musharraf forcefully amended the constitution to assume executive powers in his own hands by inserting a 17th amendment to the constitution. After his election to the Presidency through a referendum in 2002, he vowed to vacate the office of COAS, but he reneged on his promises. Such was his resolve to hold on to the office of COAS that he once likened his uniform to his ‘skin’.

The decline of General Musharraf can be traced to his fateful decision to dismiss  Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary on March 9, 2007. Under pressure, the Chief Justice refused to resign and decided to defend himself against the charges filed by the government in the Supreme Judicial Council. The shameful harassment of the Chief Justice shown on live TV by the independent media unleashed a storm of popular anger and galvanized a community of lawyers. The rise of the ‘black coats movement’ is a remarkable event in the checkered political history of Pakistan. Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary emerged as an icon of this movement for restoration of democracy following his refusal to resign. Since his appointment to the post, Justice Chaudhary had gained wide-spread respect for his no-nonsense approach to justice. During his tenure, he took suo moto action on numerous controversial issues such as the privatization of Pakistan Steel Mills and the petitions filed by the family members of missing persons, alleged to have been kidnapped by the intelligence agencies. Through these actions, Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary made powerful enemies. Under his leadership, the judiciary emerged as a counter-balance to the executive arm, leading to the creation of balance of power between various institutions. This was the context in which General Musharraf decided to remove Justice Chaudhary from his post, marking the beginning of the end for his regime.    

Traditionally, attorneys have been at the fore-front of movements for democracy in Pakistan. But the current movement of lawyers is the most powerful social movement to emerge in the recent history of the country. They benefited tremendously from their network of associations, organizing boycotts, protests and sit-ins. This gave an opportunity to civil society, political parties, and masses in general to vent their frustration with the government. The electronic media, which had ironically gained independence during the Musharraf era, played a critical role in mobilizing the masses. The lawyers’ rallies  were shown live on TV, which motivated an ever-increasing number of people to join the movement. The prime time discussion programs further discredited the government and gave an impetus to popular anger. As the ‘black coats’ movement intensified, political parties also brought their cadres onto the street. It was under this tremendous popular demand for justice that the Supreme Judicial Council dismissed all charges against Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary, reinstating him as the Chief Justice of Pakistan.

When General Musharraf decided to run for President in September 2007, his candidacy was challenged in several petitions filed in the Supreme Court. Though Justice Chaudhary distanced himself from these cases, the government feared that the Supreme Court was going to rule against the general. This prompted General Musharraf to declare a state of emergency on November 3, 2007. This second coup by General Musharraf was vociferously resisted by political parties, lawyers and other members of civil society. The return of Benazir Bhutto in the wake of an alleged “deal” with the government mediated by Washington galvanized the PPP. Under extreme domestic and international pressure, General Musharraf finally shed his military uniform and handed over the leadership of the armed forces to General Ashfaq Kayani. The results of the February 2008 elections reflected the overwhelming rejection of the policies of the Musharraf government by the people of Pakistan. This was also made possible by the tremendous sympathy vote for the PPP following the tragic assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007. The top brass of the army, led by General Kayan, distanced itself from politics, making fair elections possible. Following the formation of national and provincial governments in March/April 2008, General Musharraf was further isolated. It would have been more prudent for the general to resign gracefully following the debacle of February elections, but like his predecessors, he chose to cling to power till the last moment.

Nine years of General Musharraf’s leadership have proven to be a disaster for Pakistan and have exposed the incapability of military men to manage political affairs. One hopes that the Pakistani military elites have learned their lesson and refrain from assuming power in the future. The international community, especially the United States, has been especially supportive of General Musharraf since he decided to join the “war against terrorism.” If anything, the last nine years have shown that military dictatorship sows the seeds of instability and extremism. If Pakistan, in possession of nuclear weapons and located in a strategically important region, is to emerge as a stable entity, further derailment of the democratic process can not be tolerated. It is high time that the powers that be, both within and outside Pakistan, learn this lesson.             


Hasan  Askari-Rizvi, “Musharraf’s Mistakes”, Daily Times, August 24, 2008, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C08%5C24%5Cstory_24-8-2008_pg3_2

Mohammad Waseem, “The Bar and the Bench: The Lawyers Movement in Pakistan, 2007-2008”, Unpublished Paper.