Derrick V. Frazier, Assistant Professor, Political Science; and Robert Stewart-Ingersoll, Assistant Professor, Grand Valley State University

Most people in the U.S., including the Democratic presidential candidates, want to get out of Iraq. They put forth the rationale that it has been a flawed policy, beginning with faulty evidence and ending with a missing or incomplete exit strategy. Furthermore, most claim that there has been little positive political movement on the part of the Iraqi government and that there seems to be little prospect of success using any measure. When added to the large burden placed on the U.S. in blood and treasure, such conclusions seemingly lead one to a logical assessment in support of withdrawal. While sympathetic to such an assessment, we believe this evaluation is not as sound as it appears. In large part, this is due to the fact that such logic pays little attention to the consequences of doing so, consequences that may actually lead to far worse scenarios for the United States and the international community.

To begin, consider the regional context. As a whole, the Middle East contains four so-called regional powers (i.e. states that exert strong levels of influence on their region): Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. With respect to the current situation in Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the most important to consider. As is the case in any system in which there are multiple core powers, these states angle and compete with one another for power and influence. What is perhaps distinct about the tension between these two specific regional powers though, is the importance of religious/cultural identity as well as traditional state power considerations – that being a Sunni identity in the case of Saudi Arabia, and a Shia identity in the case of Iran.

These particular identities hold a high degree of importance to not only these states, but to the people within the region who belong to one group or the other, each with a corresponding sense of fundamental conflict and history of violence between them. Added to this sense of conflict, such groups do not exist solely within existing state borders and in many cases, experience serious economic, political, and social disadvantages, relative to the other. The reason that this is such an important point is that it is not the existence of ethnic differences per se that creates a ripe condition for ethnic conflict. It is the existence of different ethnic groups, in combination with these sorts of economic, political, and social grievances that does. The existence of a history of conflict, as well as a fundamental difference in religious beliefs magnifies the set of points that one group can rally around against the other.

Perhaps nowhere are such ripe conditions for ethnic conflict more apparent than in Iraq right now, where a repressive regime that represented and benefited the minority Sunni population has given way to a government that favors the interests of the majority Shia, as well as providing more influence for the Kurds, both of whom have withstood brutal repression and discrimination for several decades. Such transition represents an opportunity for previously disadvantaged groups to reap the benefits that they perceive as justifiably due, increasing the losses for the Sunni population so long in control of Iraq. Accentuating this loss for the Sunnis is the fact that they also happen to primarily occupy the part of Iraq that does not possess a wealth of oil resources, diminishing their ability to sustain a prosperous life by themselves in the near future. Given this, Iraq is ripe for a major sectarian conflict that exceeds the levels of violence witnessed thus far. Without the imposition of security (in physical, economic, political, and social terms), largely guaranteed by the U.S., the possibility of escalation into a full-scale civil war remains very real. As two prominent international security experts put it in 2006, “The only thing standing between Iraq and a descent into a Lebanon- or Bosnia-style maelstrom is 140,000 American troops, and even they are merely slowing the fall at this point.”

Moreover, the conflict within Iraq to a large degree mirrors both the identity conflict as well as the traditional power politics game that defines the region as a whole. To be certain, this simplifies the Iraqi conflict quite a bit, given the in-fighting between sects of the same identity groups as well. However, in terms of the broader strategic interests of the regional powers, the defining fault-line in Iraq is centered on the recession of Sunni control over a core part of the Middle East, as well as the rise of Shiism, as evidenced by the changes in Iraq and the growth of Iranian power. Such a rise, if indeed led by Iran, would represent a severe threat to U.S. interests. Included in this threat is the one potentially directed toward Saudi Arabia, a regime who has lost some or all of its credibility among Sunnis and extremist Sunni groups like Al Qaeda. The overall strategic importance of the Iraq conflict is thus very high at the regional level, making it likely that without a strong U.S. presence, states like Iran and Saudia Arabia, as well as non-state actors like Al Qaeda will make greater efforts to intervene in Iraqi affairs than they are currently making.

To these strategic regional considerations, we should also consider what would happen if a full scale civil war were to break out. Civil wars tend to spread in disease-like fashion to surrounding countries, particularly if these countries possess similar dynamics of ethnic unrest. Unfortunately, in the Middle East countries surrounding Iraq do exhibit characteristics that make them susceptible to civil conflicts. These characteristics include persistent economic, political, and social grievances that seem to correlate highly with ethnic identities and repressive police states that lack popular legitimacy or peaceful means through which to resolve these grievances. Thus, we would expect that escalated conflict in Iraq will lead to outright conflict in these countries or widespread destabilization.

Into this dangerous mix of conditions, several important spillover effects tend to occur. First, masses of refugees flow into neighboring countries. This is already occurring in the case of Iraq but would certainly increase if hostilities escalated. These mass flows lead to two further spillover effects: a straining of the host’s resources and a potential radicalization of neighboring populations through the dissemination of information regarding grievances and tales of brutality. Both increase the likelihood of destabilization in the host country and may lead to calls for the host government to intervene, a scenario likely to create further conflict with little political change. Finally, such conditions also lead to a fourth spillover effect, increased activity of terrorist groups that organize, identify, and fight across borders.

Thus, while it may seem like an impossible mission, the U.S. seemingly must remain in Iraq to limit the possibility of such events taking place as there seems to be little else in the way of preventing such disasters. Allowing Iraq and perhaps the region to descend into a broader war would be anathema to the U.S. and global interests. First, the U.S. would have to recognize that it was its own 2003 invasion of Iraq that triggered such a humanitarian and strategic nightmare. Aside from this, the economic implications of such an expanded conflict would be enormous. A potential collapse of the provision of oil from the Middle East would be devastating to the global economy, something that the U.S. and other world powers would not tolerate. Regional conflict then would not only be tragic in its own right, but likely invite interventions from larger outside powers.

Staying in Iraq does not mean doing so forever. We should not forget, however, that it has only been five years thus far, a much shorter time period than previous occupations with conditions more conducive to achieving success (e.g. Germany, Japan, South Korea). In the meanwhile, the U.S. must continue working to assist the Iraqis in finding political arrangements that address the interests of the main parties and protect them from the threats that they perceive to their own security. For the Shia and the Kurds, this means that they will be granted the power in Iraq they are legitimately due, given the proportion of the population they comprise. For the Sunnis, this means acquiring a sufficient share of political power and oil-generated wealth so they do not fear a perpetual state of disenfranchisement. This sense of security may come from dividing up key political, police, and military positions amongst ethnic representatives, even in ways that are disproportionate to their population share. The protection of minority interests is essential for ending such a conflict. This requires a government that is up to the task of building infrastructure, providing essential public goods, ensuring security, and working with diverse groups – duties that the current Maliki government has not demonstrated an ability to perform, up to this point. The inconvenient truth, however, is that to leave now basically ensures that such duties will never be fulfilled.